67/11/13 Brief of National District Attorneys Assocation Amicus Curiae, in support of Respondent by Wood, Harry et al.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
United States Supreme Court Court Documents
11-11-1967
67/11/13 Brief of National District Attorneys
Assocation Amicus Curiae, in support of
Respondent
Harry Wood
Harry E. Sondheim
Brenden T. Byrne
Charles Moylan Jr.
Evelle T. Younger
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/
terryvohio_supremecourtdocs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Documents at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
United States Supreme Court by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wood, Harry; Sondheim, Harry E.; Byrne, Brenden T.; Moylan, Charles Jr.; and Younger, Evelle T., "67/11/13 Brief of National
District Attorneys Assocation Amicus Curiae, in support of Respondent" (1967). United States Supreme Court. 10.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/terryvohio_supremecourtdocs/10
INTHE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM, 1967 
No. 67 
JOHN W. TERRY, et al., Petitioners, 
-vs.-
STATE OF OHIO, Respondent. 
BRIEF OF NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 
ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE, IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT. 
Of Counsel: 
HARRY WOOD 
Chief, Appellate Division 
HARRY y E. SONDHEIM, 
Deputy District Attorney 
Los Angeles County 
600 Hall of Justice 
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012 
November 13, 1967 
BRENDAN T. BYRNE, 
Essex County Prosecutor, 
Court House 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 
CHARLES MOYLAN, JR. 
States Attorney 
City and County of Baltimore 
304 Court House 
Baltimore, Md. 21202, 
EVELLE T. YOUNGER, 
District Attorney, 
Los Angeles County, 
600 Hall of Justice, 
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012, 
Amicus Curiae, Committee for the 
National District 
Attorneys Association. 
647 
,. 
' 
I 
!. 
I 
I 
i. 
!l 
648 
SUBJECT INDEX 
Page 
Reasons for Filing an Amicus Curiae Brie£ ·······-··· 1 
Summary of Argument ·································-··········· 4 
Argument ···························· ····-···········-···-·-······ 6 
I. 
Serriantics ..........................................................••...... 6 
II. 
Granting the Police the Right of Temporary 
Field Detention and Protective Patdown on a 
Standard Less Than Probable Cause to Arrest 
Is the Only Effective Way to Meet "the Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society" ...................... 9 
A. Temporary Field Detention ........................ 9 
1. The Role of Temporary Field Deten-
tion in the Prevention and Investiga-
tion of Crime ........................................ 9 
2. The Use of Temporary Field Deten-
tion Has Received Overwhelming 
Support From Society ........................ 15 
3. An Absolute Prohibition Upon Tem-
porary Field Detention Will Only 
Penalize Law Enforcement Officers 
Who Are Conscientiously Attempting 
to Comply With the Law While at 
the Same Time Affording No Sub-
stantial Benefits to Those Whose 
Rights May Presently Be Violated .... 18 
4. Temporary Field Detention Is Con-
stitutional Without Probable Cause to 
Arrest .................................................... 23 
11. 
Page 
B. A Constitutional Standard for a Protec-
tive · Patdown Should Be Upheld ............ 26 
C. Evidence Recovered as the Result of a 
Protective Patdown Which Meets the Nec-
essary Constitutional Standards Should 
Be Admissible .............................................. 29 
III. 
California Has Established Workable Constitu-
tional Standards for Temporary Field Deten-
tion and Protective Patdown .............................. 31 
A. When Can a California Citizen Be Sub-
jected to a Temporary Field Detention? .... 34 
B. When Can a California Citizen Be Sub-
jected to a Protective Patdown? ................ 36 
C. In Those Situations Where a Protective 
Patdown Is Permissible, to What Degree 
of Probing Must a California Citizen Be 
Subjected as Part qf the Protective Pat-
down? ............................................................ 38 
Conclusion .................................................................... 39 
649 
650 
111. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases Page 
Bell v. United States, 280 F. 2d 717 .................. 10 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 ............................ 21 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 .............. 25 
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A. 
2d 873 ···························································· 28 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 .......................... 33 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 ........ 13, 15, 20 
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 .................. 23 
Hill v. Nelson, 271 F. Supp. 439 ............................ 27 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 .................. 21 
Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 174 A. 2d 
560 .......................................................................... 10 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 .............................. 8 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ............................. .20, 40 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 ............................ 33 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ................ 3, 14, 26 
People v. Henze, 253 A.C.A. 1083 .......................... 35 
People v. Hunt, 250 A.C.A. 377, 58 Cal. Rptr. 385 35 
People v. Martines, 228 Cal. App. 2d 245, 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 526 .............................................................. 38 
People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P. 2d 658 
··············································································· 36 
People v. One ·1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 
92, 396 P. 2d 706 ................................................ 34 
People v. Peters, 18 N.Y. 2d 238, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 
217, 219 N.E. 2d 595 ........................ 1, 2, 10, 28 
People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P. 2d 531 .. 39 
lV. 
Page 
Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 ............ 14 
Shipley v. State, 243 Md. 262, 220 A. 2d 585 ........ 10 
State v. Harbatuk, 95 N.J. Super, 54, 229 A. 2d 
820 .......................................................................... 6 
State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 22, 214 N.E. 2d 
114 ................ ; ............................................... 2, 10, 28 
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 ................... .20, 23 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 ........................ 23 
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412 ........................ 10, 28 
Wilson v. State, 186 So. 2d 208 .............................. 10 
Miscellaneous 
American Law Institute, Code of Prearrangment 
Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), Sec. 
2.02 ·········-················································· · ·· 16 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the 
United States ( 1967), pp. 45-46 .......................... 27 
The President's Commission - on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice, The Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society ( 1967), p. 95 
············ .. ··················· .................................... 17' 27 
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, Task Force Re-
port: The Police ( 1967) , pp. 183-85 .................. 17 
Senate 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1967) .................. -31 
Criminal Victimization in the United States: A 
Report of a National Survey ( 1967), pp. 72-74 .. 10 
Statutes 
New York Code Crim. Proc. (McKinney Supp. 
1966), Sec. 180-a .................................................. 8 
Uniform Arrest Act, Sec. 2 .................................. 8 
651 
652 
v. 
Page 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment 
·-·········--·-··--···-····-······-2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 25, 26 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment .. 
································-···-···--····-·-····--···········-3, 14, 26 
Textbooks 
Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and 
the Fourth Ame~dment, Sup. Ct. Rev. (1960), 
pp. 46, 65-66 ---···--····-····················--····················· 21 
51 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. ( 1960), pp. 395, 398 ........ 9 
51 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. (1960), pp. 402, 402-03 .. 6 
54 H. Crim. L.C. & P.S. (1963), pp. 393, 406-11 .. 7 
Perkins, Elements of Police Science, p. 297 ............ 21 
100 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
( 1952)' pp. 1182, 1205 ·····---------·------·--·-----------··· 21 
Washington University Law Quarterly (1962), 
pp. 331, 336 -·-····-··-············ ···-·-···-------·-··········-· 11 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the United States 
October Term, 1967 
No. 67 
]oHN W. TERRY, et al., 
vs. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Petitioners, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS' 
ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT 
OF RESPONDENT. 
Reasons for Filing an Amicus Curiae Brief. 
For the reasons set forth below, the National Dis-
trict Attorneys' Association, ·with the consent of all 
counsel in this case (see letters on file with the Clerk 
of the Court), has filed this brief. 
One of the basic issues underlying the instant case, 
as well as two companion cases, Sibron v. N.Y., No. 
63, and Peters v. N.Y., No. 74, is whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police practice of temporarily 
detaining persons in the "field111 on any standard2 
1W e define the contept of "temporary field detention" in Part 
I infra of our argument. 
2 As is explained in Part I infra, we do not urge any particular 
formula for the constitutional standard upon this Court, but 
merely that the standard can be less than "probable cause to ar-
rest," which is the standard urged by petitioner Terry. (See Brief 
for Petitioner, p. 13.) 
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less ·than probable cause to arrest. Our concern is with 
the broad implications of this issue, not with its par-
ticular application to any given factual situation. Con-
sequently, what we say herein will have relevance to 
the two cases arising from New York to the extent 
that the ultimate disposition of these cases touches 
upon the basic issue which we discuss herein. We have 
chosen, however, the instant case as the means for ex-
pressing our views because we feel that it permits a 
broader consideration of the problem than may other-
wise be permitted by the New York cases. 
After considering whether the Constitution prohib-
its temporary field detention on a standard less than 
probable cause to arrest and assuming the Constitution 
does not, we next consider whether the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits a protective patdown3 incidental to such 
a detention. Then, we consider the admissibility of phys-
ical evidence resulting from the protective patdown! 
3W e define the concept of "protective patdown" in Part I infra 
of our argument. 
4We limit our consideration to the admissibility of such phys-
ical evidence, as distinguished from statements obtained during 
the temporary detention, because of the factual context in which 
each of the three cases now pending before this Court has arisen. 
In each of these three cases the issue is whether or not physical 
evidence obtained as the result of a patdown was properly admis-
sible at the trial on the issue oi guilt or innocence. Collaterally, 
in determining whether the procedures leading to the patdown and 
the patdown itself do not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, 
it may be necessary to consider whether statements obtained prior 
to the patdown are admissible in determining the propriety of the 
conduct in light of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in the instant 
case the petitioner, Terry, gave a "mumbled response." 5 Ohio 
App. 2d 122, 123-24, 214 N.E. 2d 114, 116 (1966). In the 
Peters case the petitioner's response was characterized by the 
Court of Appeal as "apparent chivalry." 18 N.Y. 2d 238, 241, 
-3-
The reasons that the National District Attorneys' 
Association is interested m each of the three issues 
set forth above is that the procedures termed herein 
as "temporary field detention" and "protective pat-
down", as well as the admissibility of evidence obtained 
thereby, have received recognition and approved in var-
ious states for which members of the Association 
are counsel5 and are thus used by counsel in processing 
criminal cases. Furthermore, as will also be set forth 
with more particularity in the course of our argu-
ment, 6 these procedures have an important bearing 
upon the proper role of police in our society and thus 
will affect the legal advice given to police officers by 
the various prosecuting attorneys who are members of 
the Association. 
219 N.E. 2d 595, 597, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 217, 219 (1966). While 
this is an important issue which has Fifth Amendment aspects, it 
11eed not be considered herein since it appears that these cases 
would not be a proper vehicle for deciding such an issue since it 
has not apparently been raised by the petitioners in any of the 
three cases, nor was it decided by the state courts below. In any 
event, if the basic underlying right to conduct a temporary field 
detention on a standard less than probable cause to arrest is sus-
tained, the right to question would appear to be an integral part 
of such detention which would not be subject to Fifth Amendment 
incrimination since this type of detention does not constitute dep-
rivation of freedom of action in a "significant way." Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Rather it constitutes "general 
on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or general 
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process" which was 
"not affected by" the holding of Miranda. 384 U.S. at 488. 
5See discussion in II,A,2, and III infra oi this brief. 
6See discussion in II,A,l, II,A,3 and II,B infra of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
I. 
Semantics. 
Definition of the terms "temporary field detention" 
and "prot~ctive patdown," as well as indicating the 
proposed solution to the use of these police investiga-
tive devices. 
We urge that a constitutional standard for these 
two investigatory techniques be adopted without spe-
cifically setting forth any particular formula for such 
standard in order that each state may have sufficient 
flexibility to develop its own semantic definition and 
conceptual underpining of that standard. This Court 
would thus play the same role in determining whether 
that standard has been met, as it does in determining 
whether or not probable cause for a search warrant 
or an arrest exists, nam~ly, review of each case to de-
termine whether the standard established by the state 
and applied to the facts of the case comply with the 
Constitution. 
II. 
Temporary Field Detention, Protective Patdown and 
the Admissibility of Evidence. 
Based upon ( 1) society's need for the investiga-
tory techniques of temporary field detention and pro-
tective patdown, (2) upon the acceptance of these tech-
niques by society, (3) upon the recognition that the 
abuse of power by unscrupulous police officers will not 
be eliminated or reduced by eradicating these techniques 
-5-
at the expense of those officers who conscientiously 
attempt ~o comply with the Constitution, and ( 4) upon 
the interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by 
this Court in the past, we contend that evidence ob-
tained by the proper use of these techniques is admis-
sible in a state trial. 
III. 
California. 
The State of California, in a sense, is an experimen-
tal laboratory in which the judiciary has been able to 
impose constitutional standards with respect to these 
techniques which distinguish lawful police investiga-
tory techniques from abuse of power, while protecting 
1 
both the individual citizen and society as a whole. 
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ARGUMENT. 
I 
SEMANTICS. 
The phrase "temporary field detention" is used here-
in to mean those situations in which a citizen is stopped 
by a police officer for investigation in the field while 
either a pedestrian, or occupant of a vehicle at a time 
when the officer stopping the citizen does not have 
probable cause to arrest the citizen. 7 It thus includes 
the so-called "stop" part of "stop and frisk." We use 
the phrase "protective patdown" to indicate a cursory 
running of the officer's hands over the outer gar-
ments of a person who is stopped which may lead to a 
search of what is contained in the garments if the cur-
sory patdown discloses the possible existence of a weap-
on which could be harmful to the officer. We use this 
phrase to make clear that we are supporting the use 
of a cursory search of an individual only in those 
situations where the facts known to the police officer 
indicate it is necessary for the protection of the of-
ficer and not in those situations where it is used as a 
subterfuge for an exploratory search. 
Much of the literature, both from the commentators 
and the courts, relating to the problems of temporary 
field detention and protective patdown involves, in part, 
semantic analysis.8 It is quite clear that a distinction 
'This brief is not intended to condone or support detentions 
at a police station "for investigation," where probable cause to 
arrest did not exist at the time the suspect was taken to the 
station. 
BThus in State v. Harbatuk, 95 N.J. Super. 54, 229 A. 2d 820 
( 1967), the concept of detention was distinguished from arrest; 
and see Foote. The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in, 
the Law of Arrest. 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 402, 402-03 (1960), 
for further semanticism. 
-7-
can be drawn both historically9 and practically10 
between an arrest and a detention, as well as between 
a protective patdown and a search. By narrowing the 
concept of the words "search" or "seizure" as con-
tained in the Fourth Amendment to only arrest and 
intensive search situations one can completely eliminate 
the problems posed by the trilogy of cases now pending 
before the Court. However, we propose to assume, with-
out conceding, that a temporary detention is encom-
passed by the concept of a seizure (although not with-
in the concept of an arrest) and a frisk is encom-
passed by the concept of a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.11 However, this does not 
mean that the only searches or seizures authorized by 
the Fourth Amendment are those for which there is 
probable cause to arrest, or consent or a warrant. 12 
Indeed, this assumes the answer to the issue in the 
same way as does one who says a detention is n9t an 
arrest. 
An additional area of possible semantic misunder-
standing relates to the test which must be met in order 
for a temporary field detention to be valid, if a stand-
ard less than probable cause for an arrest is permis-
sible. This standard has received various semantic ex-
9 A probative analysis of the historical distinction between arrest 
and detention (as well as of other problems inherent in the 
trilogy of cases before this Court) can be found in Leagre, The 
Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & 
P.S. 393. 406-11 ( 1963). 
10While it may be inconvenient for a citizen to be detained, 
it is certainly less inconvenient than being arrested and taken to 
jail. 
11This appears to be the basis for the discussion of the con-
stitutional right to detain in Leagre, supra note 9. 
12This is discussed in our brief in II,A.4 infra and in Leagre, 
supra note 9. 
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planations, such as "reasonably suspects,ma "reasonable 
ground to suspect,m• et cetera, all of which, however, 
are based upon the same premise, namely, that some 
standard less than probable cause to arrest. is accept-
able. We propose not to define this standard in this 
brief since it may differ semantically from state to 
state. Rather, we shall use the phrases "constitutional 
standard for temporary field detention" and "constitu-
tional standard for protective patdown" (or similar 
conceptionalization) in the belief that each state should 
be free to adopt whatever terminology it desires as 
well as the conceptual bases underlying this terminology 
so long as such terminology and the underlying con-
cepts when applied to a particular factual situation, 
are consistent with the standard required by the Con-
stitution. 
Thus it is our hope that this Court will recognize 
the existence of a constitutional standard for temporary 
field detention (which is less than probable cause to 
arrest) and for protective patdown, and will not pre-
clude the states "from developing workable rules gov-
erningm5 temporary field detention and protective pat-
down "to meet 'the practical demands of effective crim-
inal investigation and law enforcement' in the States.me 
Thus this Court would overturn only those cases in 
which a particular temporary field detention ,or protec-
tive patdown was unconstitutional. 
13N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1966). 
14UNrFoRM ARREST Acr § 2. 
1"Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). 
16/bid. 
-9-
II. 
GRANTING THE POLICE THE RIGHT OF TEMPO-
RARY FIELD DETENTION AND PROTECTIVE 
PATDOWN ON A STANDARD LESS THAN PROB-
ABLE CAUSE TO ARREST IS THE ONLY EF-
FECTIVE WAY TO MEET "THE CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY."17 
A. Temporary Field Detention. 
1. The Role of Temporary Field Detention in the Preven-
tion and Investigation of Crime. 
The three cases now pending before this Court are 
demonstrative evidence of the role of temporary field 
detention in meeting the challenge of crime by pre-
venting the commission of serious criminal activity. 
Thus, in the instant cases it is reasonable to infer 
that petitioner Terry was prevented from engaging in 
an armed robbery, petitioner Sib_ron was prevented from 
engaging in housebreaking, and petitioner Peters was 
prevented from engaging in the sale of narcotics. This 
is undoubtedly an important task for the police to per-
f orm.18 Indeed, the need for the prevention of crime, in 
addition to the apprehension of criminals who have al-
ready committed crimes, is evident from the fear for 
17Title of the 1967 report submitted by the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 
lS"It is better to have an alert police force that prevents the 
crime than one that devotes its time to seeking to identify the 
assailant after the life has been taken, the daughter ravished, or 
the pedestrian slugged and robbed." Wilson, Police Arrest Privi-
leges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. 
L.C. & P.S. 395, 398 (1960) . 
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personal safety felt by citizens regarding walking alone 
in their neighborhood after dark.19 
An additional important aspect of the role of tem-
porary field detention which is not apparent from the 
facts of the instant cases is the use of such detentions 
for apprehending persons who have already committed 
crimes, independent of those discovered during the de-
tention. 20 
The use of this method by the police is widespread 
and has been found by them to be effective both in 
preventing and investigating crime.21 As noted in the 
19See NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Criminal Victimization in the United 
States: A Report of a National Survey (hereinafter referred to as 
Field Surveys II) 72-74 ( 1967). 
20See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 280 F. 2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 
1960) where officers, hearing screams for help at 4 :30 a.m. 
and seeing defendant running near the point from which the 
screams had come, detained defendant for purposes of checking 
on the distress call. Had the officers not stopped him, his iden-
tity might never have been _known and subsequent apprehension 
entirely frustrated thereby. See also Wilson v. State, .... Miss . 
.... , 186 So. 2d 208 (1966), in which a highway patrol officer, 
having received a radio ca11 to be on the lookout for a light-
colored Plymouth station wagon in connection with a burglary, 
observed one parked outside a restaurant and requested the oc-
cupants to wait a few minutes in order to speak with a sheriff's 
deputy who was investigating the case. The deputy, arriving 
shortly thereafter, found sufficient evidence to constitute probable 
cause for arrest. Again, it is possible, if not likely, that without 
the detention ultimate apprehension of the perpetrators would not 
have occurred. 
Indeed. of the 23 cases in the appendix to this brief, only 
5 are not of this type. These 5 are Shipley v. State, 243 Md. 
262, 220 A. 2d 585 (1966), People v. Peters, 18 N.Y. 2d 238, 
273 N.Y.S. 2d 217, 219 N.E. 2d 595 (1966), State v. Terry, 
S Ohio App. 2d 22, 214 N.E. 2d 114 (1966), Kavanagh v. Sten-
lnouse, 93 RI. 252, 174 A. 2d 560 (1961), Wilson v. Porter, 
361 F. 2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966). 
21see MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, REPORT To THE PREsr-
DENT's Co~rMISSION oN LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JuSTICE, A National Survey of Police and Community 
-11-
Task Force Report: The Police, prepared by the Pres-
ident's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice: 
"The police consider field interrogations to be 
an important method of preventing and investigat-
ing crime, since they rarely encounter a crime in 
progress. Normally, by the time a police officer has 
Relations (hereinafter referred to as Field Surveys V) 327-31, 
333 ( 1966). See also La Fave, Detention for Investigation. by the 
Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, WASH. U. L.Q. (1962) 
331, wherein it is stated at 336 : 
"This practice, referred to by the police as 'field interroga-
tion,' may be accompanied by a frisk of the suspect when 
the officer deems it necessary for his own protection. Re-
ports are of ten made of these field interrogations, which 
may later prove most useful; for example, if a burglary is 
later reported in the area where the suspicious person was 
found, the police then have a particular suspect who can 
be investigated further." 
Thus, for example, we are informed by the Los Angeles Po-
lice Department that it recently inaugurated a system which 
computerized field detention interrogation cards made out after 
a person in a vehicle has been stopped for field interrogation 
or arrested. Solely on the basis of l~ds obtained from the com-
puterized field identification cards for such vehicle stops, 175 
felony crimes, involving 67 persons who were not arrested at 
the time of the field interrogation, were solved and led to the 
filing of felony complaints against 48 of these defendants (in 
some instances felony charges were not filed because, for ex-
ample, the defendant was already involved in other criminal 
charges or the victim refused to prosecute). The solution of these 
crimes resulted from the utilization of field interrogation cards 
from four divisions of the Los Angeles. Police Department during 
the period January 1, 1967, to November 1, 1967. Because of the 
success oi this program it is now being expanded to include ~11 
16 divisions of the Los Angeles Police Department. However, 
for purposes of meaningful statistics, it is impossible to deter-
mine how many field interrogation cards were filled out in situa-
tions where the police did not have probable cause to arrest at 
the time of the initial stopping since such cards are made out 
on any "good suspect," irrespective of whether probable cause 
for his arrest existed at the time of his initial stopping. It is 
clear, however, that as to these 67 defendants such probable 
cause did not exist since they were never arrested at the time 
of their initial detention. Unfortunately, the work of the Los 
(This footnote is continued on the next page) 
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arrived at a crime scene, the perpetrator has fled, 
people have gathered, and confusion has ensued. 
Further, the police believe that they can prevent 
much crime if they are permitted to stop and ques-
tion persons whose behavior strongly suggests that 
a criminal act is being contemplated." (pp. 183-
84.) 
Although the need for some investigation as to the 
usefulness of this procedure was recognized in one of 
the studies underlying the Task Force Report on the 
police,22 unfortunately no such study was ever con-
ducted nor have we been able to find any probative in-
quiry with respect to the actual amount of crime either 
prevented or solved as the result of the temporary field 
detention technique. However, the mere fact that statis-
tical analysis is not available which would indicate the 
exact percentage or quantity of crime prevented or 
solved does not mean that the need for temporary field 
detentions is based on _mere speculation. (See the sec-
ond paragraph of footnote 21, supra) for evidence of 
the usefulness of field interrogation in solving crime 
Angeles Police Department has not been geared for statistical 
purposes to ascertain the percentage or number of persons who 
are stopped in situations wherein probable cause to arrest does 
not exist, but who are eventually arrested upon the basis of prob-
able cause developed during the course of the temporary field 
detention or developed later on the basis of leads derived solely 
from that detention. 
22See F-ield Surveys V, supra note 21, wherein it is stated at 
336 : 
"Second, because of the critical nature of the field inter-
view contact, would it not seem consistent to evaluate the 
practice in terms of the usefulness of the information gained? 
Does it really, as speculated, enable an investigator to place 
an occurrence or individual in a time-place context for the 
purpose of successfully conducting inquiry? No evaluation of 
this type seems to have been available! It should be given 
some thought." 
-13-
which, however, cannot be transformed into any sta-
tistical percentage.) 
First, the experience of the police has indicated to 
them that it is a necessary technique and this certainly 
should have some weight in determining whether or not 
it is required in society, albeit police perception of 
this need may not be subject to the same critical analy-
ses which underlie some of the surveys prepared for 
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice. 
Second, as will be set forth in the succeeding por-
tion oi this argument, even those outside of law en-
forcement who have considered and studied the need 
for this technique have concluded that such technique is 
required in society.23 · The existence of overwhelming, 
unanimous judicial and legislative authority in support 
of this practice in 17 state jurisdictions and 7 circuits 
of the Courts of Appeals is the type of evidence which 
has previously been deemed "pragmatic evidence of a 
sort"24 in situations where "it cannot positively be 
demonstrated that enforcement of the criminal law is 
either more or less effective under either rule [the ex-
clusionary rule]."26 
Third, we submit that it would be extremely reck-
less to strike down this technique merely on the as-
sumption that, because its quantitative usefulness has 
not been determined with exactitude, it is not a tech-
nique worth saving for society. If this assumption 
proved later to be wrong, the results could be disas-
23See II,A,2 infra. 
24Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), wherein 
this Court considered the experience of both federal and state 
courts in applying the exclusionary rule. 
25Jbid. 
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trous in regard to society's ability to meet the chal-
lenge of crime. We suggest, therefore, that a more 
appropriate way of approaching this problem is to ac-
cept the role of this technique in our society until 
such time as its usefulness has been adequately dis-
proved and to determine whether its role in society 
can be sustained without infringing upon constitutional 
protections afforded to citizens by the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
Before concluding our discussion of ohe importance 
of temporary field detention to society in its struggle 
against crirrie, we wish to point out a basic distinction 
between the recognition of this interest in deciding 
questions relating to the Fourth Amendment and those 
relating to the Fifth Amendment. We are aware that 
in Miranda v. Arizona, this Court indicated that the 
need for a police technique cannot be weighed against 
the privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment be-
cause that privilege is absolute.26 The Fourth Amend-
ment, however, by its very terminology, makes it clear 
that it is not absolute since it uses the word "unrea-
sonable," thereby recognizing that some searches and 
seizures are reasonable. Thus in construing the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment this Court must apply a 
balancing test. 
To describe conduct as "unreasonable" is a value 
judgment, not a statement of objective fact.27 Once 
26384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1966). 
27In Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 li.S. 56 (1950), the 
Court states : 
"What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by 
any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what 
are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our disci-
pline we have no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring ques-
tions of the reaonableness of searches must find resolution 
in the facts and circumstances of each case." 339 U.S. at 63. 
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a search or seizure is deemed to be unreasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment, certainly the interests of 
law enforcement can never justify violation of that 
guarantee. However, in judging whether a particular 
search or seizure is reasonable, the interest of society 
in effective law enforcement must be weighed against 
other interests, such as privacy and the desire to con-
tinue on one's way. Indeed, this Court, in interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment, has given recognition to the 
needs of law enforcement. 
As this Court stated in Elkins v. United States:28 
"It must always be remembered that what the 
Constitution forbids is not all searches and sei-
zures, but unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . 
[I] t can fairly be said that in applying the Fourth 
Amendment this Court has seldom shown itself 
unaware of the practical demands of effective 
criminal investigation and law enforcement."211 
2. The Use of Temporary Field Detention Has Received 
Overwhelming Support From Society. 
Almost without dissent every judicial body that has 
considered the question of whether or not it is con-
stitutionally permissible for the police to engage in the 
practice of temporary field detention has upheld this 
practice. We have set forth in an appendix to this brief 
the 16 states and 7 federal circuit courts of appeals in 
which appellate courts have considered and upheld this 
practice. We have listed for each jurisdiction one re-
cent leading case, even though there may be additional 
cases supporting this practice from each jurisdiction. 
Additionally, if a statute has been enacted in a ju-
2s364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
211Id. at 222. 
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risdiction, we have included the citation to the enact-
ment. In addition to the 16 states which have upheld 
this practice by judicial decision, one jurisdiction has 
a statute authorizing the practice but there appears 
to be no case interpreting the constitutionality of the 
statute. We have found no jurisdiction which has 
struck down the practice of temporary field detention. 
In short, judicial support for the retention of this prac-
tice is unanimous in this country. 
The two national bodies which have most recently en-
gaged in studies in this field have concluded that the 
practice of temporary field detention should be retained 
in our society. Thus, the American Law Institute rec-
ommends the enactment of legislation recognizing the 
lawfulness and necessity oi this practice.80 The Pres-
ident's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice recommends the continuation of this 
practice as follows: 
"If the police were_ forbidden to stop persons at 
the scene of a crime, or in situations that strong-
ly suggest criminality, investigative leads could be 
lost as persons disappeared into the massive im-
personality of an urban environment. Yet police 
practice must distinguish carefully between legiti-
mate field interrogations and indiscriminate deten-
tion and street searches of persons and vehicles. 
"The Commission recommends: 
State legislatures should enact statutory provi-
sions with respect to the authority of law enforce-
ment officers to stop persons for brief question-
30See ALI CODE OF PREARRANGEMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). 
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ing, including specifications of the circumstances 
and limitations under which stops are permissible. 
"Such authority would cover situations in which, 
because of the limited knowledge of a policeman 
just arriving at the scene, there is not sufficient 
basis for arrest. Specific limitations on the cir-
cumstances of a stop, the length of the ques-
tioning, and the grounds for a frisk would pre-
vent the kind oi misuse of field interrogation that, 
the Commission study also indicated, occurs today 
in a substantial number of street incidents in some 
cities. "81 
Finally, it should be noted that while empirical data 
underlying the Commission's study appears to be rather 
limited and the circumstances under which the data 
was collected may be open to some close scrutiny, it 
appears that an overwhelming majority of citizens in-
terviewed did favor at least the right to stop a person 
and ask bis name and address when he is anywhere 
outside his home. 82 Of course, we recognize that a 
81THE PRESIDENT'S Co11MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF }t:STICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SocIETY 95 ( 1967). See also THE PRESIDENT'S Co1.n.ns-
SION ON LAW ENFORCE!-IENT Az.;'D ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183-85 ( 1967), wherein it 
is stated at 184: "The Commission believes that there is a 
definite need to authorize the poi ice to stop suspects and possible 
witnesses of major crimes, to detain them for brief questioning 
if they will not voluntarily cooperate, and to search such suspects 
for dangerous weapons when such a precaution is necessary." 
a2see THE UNIVERSITY OF MrcHICAN. REPORT TO THE PREst-
DENT's CoMMrssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, 1 Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in 
Major Metropolitan Areas, Section II (hereinafter referred to 
as 1 Field Si1rveys III, Section II ) 88 (1967), which indicates 
that 79% of the residents interviewed would give the police this 
right, independent of whether or not the officer believed the 
person stopped had actually committed a crime. 
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substantial portion88 of the citizens that would permit 
such stopping and questioning indicated that this right 
would depend on the circumstances. 
Perhaps the answer most representative of our socie-
ty, including the court decisions and national bodies 
ref erred to above, would be the following statement, 
given as a representative comment from personal in-
terview data regarding the practice of temporary field 
detention: 
"' ... practice is o.k. , but the way it was car-
ried out was unfriendly, abusive, etc. Not against 
method, but how it is used.' "3' 
3. An Absolute Prohibition Upon Temporary Field Deten-
tion Will Only Penalize Law Enforcement Officers Who 
Are Conscientiously Attempting to Comply With the 
Law, While at the Same Time Affording No Substan-
tial Benefits to Those Whose Rights May Presently Be 
Violated. 
It is apparent that- while the judiciary, the various 
national bodies that have recently studi~d this problem 
and the citizenry interviewed support the practice of 
temporary field detention, it is a practice which is sus-
ceptible to abuse. We do not condone or in any way 
lend our support to the misuse of this .Practice. What 
we do urge is that this practice should receive judicial 
recognition by this Court to the extent that it is not 
abused. We proceed now to discuss why entire elimina-
tion of the practice will not eliminate the abuse to 
which it is presently susceptible. 
While there may be some police officers who abuse 
their right to utilize temporary field detention, others 
33/bid. (The figure given is 23%.) 
3'See Field Surveys V, supra note 21, at 334. 
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have conscientiously attempted to comply ~ith the law 
and, because of such compliance, are not creating any 
resentment within the environment in which they oper-
ate. The most graphic example of the possible extremes 
to which the practice of temporary field detention can 
be pursued is evident from Field Surveys IV of the 
study underlying the Report to the President's C01n-
mission on Law Enforcement ood Administration of 
Justice. That study indicated that whereas in San Diego 
field interrogation was a primary target of citizen 
complaint, in Philadelphia it was not a focal point of 
such cricitism. 815 
The following is the explanation given in the survey 
for the lack of controversy regarding this practice in 
Philadelphia: 
"As commented on above, the field interrogation 
procedure has provided little cause for controversy 
in Philadelphia. This may be due to a rational use 
of the tactic without compulsory overtones, such 
as official or unofficial 'quotas'. Its apparent ac-
ceptance may also partly be due to the fact that 
it may not be noticed as much in a large, sprawl-
ing eastern city as it is in a smaller, more com-
pact western municipality. Another reason the pub-
lic may not object to field interrogations is that 
the Philadelphia Police Department has demon-
strated that it is not a tool designed exclusively to 
oppress minority group members. "H 
815THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCEMENT AND ~ 
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 2 The Police and the Com1n1inity, 
(hereinafter referred to as 2 Field Surveys IV) 170 (1966). 
88ld. at 173. 
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If the right to engage in temporary field detention 
is judged unreasonable because it may be abused, there 
would be no police procedure which could not be judged 
unreasonable upon the same ground. Indeed if pos-
sibility of abuse is justification for holding unconstitu-
tional a police practice based upon the exercise of judg-
ment by a police officer, Mapp v . Ohio31 did not reach 
the problem it was designed to solve, namely, unlawful 
searches and seizures. Such unlawful conduct is still 
present in our society, as is evident from the reported 
cases:38 To carry the "logic of possible abuse" to its 
rational conclusion, should arrests only be permitted 
if based upon warrants of arrest because some arrests 
presently are being made by police officers who exer-
cise their judgment based on facts which the courts 
sometimes find do not constitute probable cause for 
the arrests? We submit that if the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained as an incident of an unlawful arrest is 
a sufficient . deterrent. to unlawful arrests, 39 why 
should not the exclusion of evidence obtained as an in-
cident oi a temporary field detention which does not 
meet the constitutional standard for such detention also 
be a sufficient deterrent to its abuse? 
Thus. if the practice of temporary field detention is 
judicially limited to its reasonable exercise, all that 
this Court will have done is to legalize its proper use, 
not its abuse. Indeed, to prohibit it entirely because 
3i367 G.S. 643 (1961 ). 
~RSee. e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 li.S. 483 ( 1964). 
39"0nly last year the Court itself recognized that the pur-
pose oi the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for 
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-
by removing the incentive to disregard it.' Elkins v. United States, 
supra, at 217." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961 ). 
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of its abuse while failing to give recognition to its 
proper use "is to burn the house to roast the pig."40 
Furthermore, prohibiting this practice entirely will 
not alleviate the present abuse to which it is suscep-
tible. Studies indicate that there are already in exis-
tence a number of police practices which could very 
readily take the place of the abuse of temporary field 
detention. Thus, instead of merely detaining a person 
in the field for investigation, he could be brought down 
to the station and arrested "for investigation"41 or 
he could be arrested on some charge not directly related 
to that which the police officer is investigating.'2 
As noted ·by one commentator: 
"Pressure may be placed on the police to make 
arrests too early in the investigative process."" 
This Court recently attempted to alleviate such pres-
sure in another aspect of search and seizure when it 
stated:•• 
"The police are not required to guess at their 
peril the precise moment at which they have prob-
able cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation 
oi the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, 
• 0B11tler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
0 See Field Survey V, supra note 21, at 336 wherein it is 
stated: 
"Although arresting an individual for investigative pur-
poses. even on the basis of a specific suspected offense, is 
patently questionable, the practice is nevertheless widespread 
and fairly common." 
42PERKINS, ELEMENTS oF POLICE SCIENCE 297 (1942) . See. 
Xote. Pliiladelplzia Police Practices and the Law of Arrest, 100 
t;.PA.L.REv. 1182, 1205 (1952), regarding the "vagrancy 
dodge." 
43Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the F<>urth 
A111rnd111ent, SuP. CT. REV. (1960) 46. 65-66. 
44Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). 
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and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they 
wait too long."45 
In short, we submit that present interpretations of 
constitutional magnitude have not necessarily eliminated 
unlawful police practices. The officer who would har-
ass and abuse is doing so now; the conscientious of-
ficer is not .. If a police officer wants to roust someone, 
he will continue to do so irrespective of whether the 
practice of temporary police detention is judicially pro-
hibited. The officer who would engage in abuse can 
justify his activities under present law and even sup-
port them with perjured testimony where necessary. 
Thus. granting the conscientious officer this additional 
alternative will not increase the excesses of the officer 
who is already abusing the powers of his office. 
Should temporary field detention be upehld by this 
Court, the judicial review of its exercise will serve to 
educate the police as to the propriety of their conduct 
in the field, a function of undoubted importance in-
sofar as those police officers who attempt to conscien-
tiously obey the Constitution are concerned. On the 
other hand, total prohibition of temporary field deten-
tion would remove the opportunity for courts to de-
fine circumstances which constitute an abuse of this 
practice, affording the conscientious officer no guidance 
whatsoever as to what he should do in the proper 
prevention and investigation of crime in the field, while 
in no way restraining those officers who would abuse 
their office irrespective of constitutional protections. 
45To fail to alleviate the pressure to arrest surrounding cir-
cumstances which warrant investigation, but which are short of 
probable cause to arrest, can only further immortalize a line from 
Gilbert and Sullivan: "A policeman's lot is not a happy one." 
Pirates of Penzance, Act II (Sergeant of Police). 
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Furthermore, we submit that just as elimination of 
this practice will not aid those whose rights are truly 
abused in the field, it will not aid them in their at-
tempts to obtain recourse from the courts for such 
abuse. As recently stated by one oi the commentators: 
"Pressure may be placed on the courts to water 
down the standards for probable cause to make 
formal arrests in order to avoid freeing obviously 
guilty defendants because oi relatively minor in-
vasions of their privacy."48 
Indeed, this Court recently had occasion to note a 
similar "watering down" experience relating to the ad-
missibility of mere evidence. As noted in Warden v. 
Hayden, 47 the various courts of appeals, being bound 
by the rule of Goir,led v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 
( 1921 ) , had been compelled to stretch the concepts of 
instrumentalities of a crime or means used to commit a 
crime in order to include the recovery of physical evi-
dence which might otherwise h~ve been classified as mere 
evidence. 48 We would hope that similar confusion 
would not result in the law relating to probable cause 
for an arrest because of a failure by this Court to 
recognize the need for temporary iield detention. 
4. Temporary Field Detention Is Constitutional Without 
Probable Cause to Arrest. 
Probable cause tO arrest is oiten deemed to have 
some magic quality of clairvoyance. 49 We submit 
•&Barrett, supra note 43, at 66. 
413g7 U.S. 294 (1967). 
•B/ d. at 309: "Pressure against the rule in the federal courts 
has taken the form rather oi broadening the categories of evi-
dence subject to seizure, thereby creating considerable confusion 
in the law." 
•9See Foote, supra note 8, at 406-07. lh this article Foote 
(This footnote is continued on the next page) 
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that merely stating that the proper test is probable 
cause does not, ipso facto, create a formula which can 
intuitively be applied to the facts of a particular case. 
We submit that the establishment of concepts under-
lying a standard less than probable cause is no more 
difficult than the establishment of the concepts un-
derlying probable cause itself. Indeed we should hope 
that difficulties in conceptualizing a standard would 
not lead to judicial abnegation of this Court's clear 
duty. 
Recently a commentator undertook just this task of 
analytically probing the conceptualization which would 
be involved in establishing a standard for temporary 
field detention as well as setting forth the constitu-
tional validity of such standard. 50 After undertaking 
this task, the author concludes as follows: 
"The thesis of this paper is that a more flexible 
compromise than today exists between the right of 
privacy and legitimate police desires can be reached 
within the framework of the Fourth Amendment. 
The standard of 'probable cause' does not seem 
to have satisfactorily done its job. The result has 
been a hodgepodge oi 'vagrancy' statutes which 
often do little more than to make 'being suspicious' 
a crime and widespread evasion of the law. It 
wouid ·be far better to face the issue squarely and 
set up a system of intelligent safeguards which 
protect the security of the individual and, at the 
rails against the claimed ambiguity of standards less than prob-
able cause to arrest, as if the concept of probable cause is so 
clear to every Justice of this Court that it would never have 
caused controversy within the Court in past cases. 
sosee Leagre, supra note 9. 
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same time, do not unduly restrict the police in the 
performance of their duties. 
"Conceptually, this flexibility can be justified 
within the Fourth Amendment by the detention-
arrest distinction and a reliance upon the broad 
provision contained in the Amendment's firs.t 
clause. A test of reasonableness under all the cir-
cumstances may be the only solution to the present 
problem which can honestly be said to fulfill the 
policy of the constitutional provision. 
"The sole objection to such a test must neces-
sarily lie in its vagueness. Doubtless, this would 
present some difficulty in initial application. Yet 
there is no reason to suspect that the Court would 
be incapable of eliciting fundamental standards 
through a process of judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion. Thus it would seem difficult to conclude 
that the vice of vagueness is a sufficient reason 
for discarding a formulation of reasonableness un-
der all the circumstances ; a certain amount of such 
vagueness is rather of the essence of a constitu-
tional principle. "61 
A similar innovation in the law of search and seizure 
has been taken by this Court with respect to the con-
cept of probable cause itself. For example, in Camara 
v. Municipal Court / 2 this Court tempered probable 
cause for a search warrant with reasonableness by 
holding that "reasonableness is still the ultimate stand-
ard. "53 This seems to clearly compel the conclusion 
that the controlling concept in the Fourth Amendment 
6lfd. at 419-20. 
62387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
63/d. at 539. 
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is the standard of reasonableness and not the standard 
of probable cause alone, since the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of probable cause for search warrants is 
on its face an absolute requirement and could conceiv-
ably have been interpreted without the applicability of 
the concept of reasonableness which is found in a sep-
arate clause of that amendment. 54 
As a final note to the question of whether or not 
such an investigative practice as temporary field de-
tention is constitutional, we would recall the words of 
this Court in Miranda v. Arizona,65 which were as 
follows: 
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts sur-
rounding a crime or other general questioning of 
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected 
by our holding. It is an act of responsible citi-
zenship for individuals to give whatever informa-
tion they may have to aid in law enforcement."58 
These words would be !Jollow indeed if all they meant 
was that while the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit 
temporary field detention, the Fourth Amendment does. 
B. A Constitutional Standard for a Protective 
Patdown Should Be Upheld. 
If, as we urge, this Court adopts a constitutional 
standard authorizing the practice of temporary field 
detention, it would be "cruel and unusual punishment" 
to permit the former practice without the necessary pro-
tection of a protective patdown. In a day and age 
where attacks are being made upon the right of society 
54See the discussion of the relationship of the two clauses 
in Leagre, supra note 9, at 396-03. 
~s384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
6 6Jd. at 477-78. 
-27-
to lawfully impose the death penalty on the ground 
that its imposition is "cruel and unusual punishment,''51 
we should hope that the advocates of the abolition of 
t11e death penalty would have as much concern for those 
who enforce society's law as they do for those who en-
force the law of the jungle. Recent statistics indicate 
that the concern of police officers for their own safety 
is not phantasmagoric.58 The report of the Presi-
dent's Commission discloses that 203 of the persons 
upon whom police officers used a protective patdown 
were carrying either guns or knives. 119 We doubt that 
one out of every five citizens in this country is carrying 
a similar deadly weapon and thus we submit it is rea-
sonable for the police to single out for protective pat-
down that category of persons whom they stop pursuant 
to a constitutional standard for temporary field inter-
rogation. 
We recognize that the protective patdown, albeit ini-
tially an attempt to protect tJ1e life of the officer, may 
culminate in a criminal charge solely based upon phys-
ical evidence which was discovered as a result of that 
«>7See, e.g., Hill v. Nelson, 271 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 
1967). 
58The Uniform Crime Reports for 1966 released by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in a publication entitled, Crime in. the 
United States, discloses at pages 45-46 that during the years 
1960-1966, 41 police officers were killed while "investigating 
suspicious persons and circumstances." This number of police 
officers constitutes 12% of all the officers killed by felons during 
this period of time. In -accord with the recent rising trend of 
crime, the number of police officers killed in 1966 "by persons 
whom the officers had stopped for investigation or interrogation 
because of suspicion regarding their actions" was 18% of the 
total officers killed in 1966 ( 57 law enforcement officers). 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 45-46 ( 1967). 
1111see THE CHALLENGE oF CRIME IN A FR.EE SOCIETY, supra 
note 31, at 94-95. 
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patdown. This is true in the trilogy of cases now 
pending before this Court. It should be noted, how-
ever, that this is by no means as common as this tril-
ogy of cases would indicate.60 The right to engage 
in a protective patdown should obviously extend no 
further than the purpose for which it was conducted. 
Thus \ve would require a constitutional standard to be 
established for the protective patdown which would be 
reasonably related to the purpose of that patdown. We 
do not condone an intensive search which evidences a 
desire to explore hidden places for the purpose of find-
ing evidence other than a weapon which may be dan-
gerous to the safety of the officer. The factual situa-
tion underlying each case will determine whether or not 
this constitutional standard underlying a protective 
patdown has been met. 61 
C0The representative recent leading cases set forth in our 
appendix disclose that oi the 23 cases, in only 4 cases (including 
2 oi the cases now before this Court) was physical evidence .in-
troduced which had been found during the course of a protec-
tive patdown of the defendant's person. These cases are People 
v. Peters, 18 N.Y. 2d 238. 273 ::\.Y.S. 2d 217, 219 N.E. 2d 
595 ( 1966) ; State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 22, 214 N.E. 2d 
114 (1966); Con-unonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A. 
2d 8i3 (1966); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966). 
61In State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114 
( 1966), the following was stated: 
"However, we must be careful to distinguish that the 
'frisk' authorized herein includes only a 'frisk' for a dan-
gerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for con-
traband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence 
of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled 
by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and prob-
able cause is essential. White v. United States (1959), 106 
U.S. App. D.C. 246, 271 F. 2d 829. Therefore, we hold 
that, on the facts presented in the instant case, the 'frisk' 
for dangerous weapons was valid as an incident to a valid 
inquiry by the police. Each case must be decided upon its 
own facts." S Ohio App. 2d at 130, 214 N.E. 2d at 120. 
-29-
C. Evidence Recovered as the Result of a Protec-
tive Patdown Which Meets the Necessary Con-
stitutional Standards Should Be Admissible. 
In order to place the issue of admissibility of evi-
dence recovered as the result of a protective patdown 
in its proper perspective, it must be remembered that 
we urge a constitutional standard ior such a protec-
tive patdown which will not automatically authorize a 
protective patdown during every temporary field de-
tention. The reasoning underlying the nonadmissibility 
of such evidence appears to be that by making inad-
missible all evidence recovered, whether lawfully or un-
lawfully, some pressure to engage in protective pat-
downs which do not meet constitutional standards will 
have been alleviated. Such argument, although perhaps 
superficially appealing, is patently fallacious. 
At the present time police officers who are con-
scientiously attempting to perform their duty (such as 
is apparently the case in Philadelphia, as noted above) 62 
will engage in a protective patdown only when it is 
necessary for their own protection, and not as a sub-
terfuge for a general exploratory search. If this Court, 
however, indicates to the police that it makes no dif-
ference whether or not the protective patdown meets 
constitutional standards insofar as the admissibility of 
evidence is concerned, what would deter any policeman 
from always engaging in a protective patdown, even if 
it does not meet constitutional standards? This Court, 
if it holds that police may engage in protective pat-
downs which meet a constitutional standard but that 
the evidence recovered thereby is inadmissible, instead 
of prohibiting the abuse of this practice will have placed 
82See II,A,3 supra. 
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a premium upon its use in all situations. In short, if 
this Court hold that protective patdowns which meet 
a constitutional standard are to be recognized, it must 
necessarily follow that the evidence recovered thereby 
must also be admissible if an irrational dichotomy lead-
ing to police abuse is not to follow. 
Additionally, it should be noted that although the 
trilogy of cases presently pending before this Court all 
involve evidence recovered during a protective patdown, 
a substantial amount, if not the majority of evidence 
discovered during a temporary field detention, is ob-
tained by methods solely unrelated to a protective pat-
down.63 Unless this Court were to rule that all evidence 
obtained during a temporary · field detention is inad-
missible, we sµbmit that there is no logical nor prac-
tical basis for distinguishing between the methods where-
by evidence is recovered during that detention so long 
as the methods meet constitutional standards. Thus, 
ii during a temporary field detention which meets con-
stitutional standards, an officer visually observes nar-
cotics which have been thrown away by the suspect 
or known stolen property in a vehicle containing the 
suspect, what justification can there be for admitting 
this type of evidence and not admitting that which is 
obtained by a protective patdown conducted in a con-
stitutional manner? On the other hand, if this Court 
were to hold that no evidence whatsoever which is re-
covered dufing a temporary field detention is admis-
sible, the underlying purpose of the detention, namely, 
to investigate possible criminal conduct, will have been 
def eat ed. The form of temporary field detention will 
exist but not its substance (except for verbal state-
63See note 60 supra. 
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ments made by a defendant, an issue which 1s not 
discussed herein). 64 
Finally, it should be noted that in those situations 
where evidence is recovered during the protective pat-
down, in an overwhelming majority of cases it con-
stitutes the very item for which the officer was seek-
ing, namely, a dangerous weapon. 66 Thus, the admis-
sion of such weapons as evidence is merely consistent 
with the purpose underlying the protective patdown.66 
Indeed, in an age where society has shown a concern 
for the availability of dangerous weapons,67 one would 
question judicial policy prohibiting the admissibility of 
such evidence if discovered during a protective pat-
down comporting to constitutional standards. 
III. 
CALIFORNIA HAS ESTABLISHED WORKABLE CON-
STITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR TEMPORARY 
FIELD DETENTION AND PROTECTIVE PAT-
DOWN. 
We have pointed out previously that the concept of 
probable cause is not an absolute standard capable of 
intuitive perception. It is a judgment which is inherent-
ly flexible while at the same time permitting constitu-
64See note 4 supra. 
65See 2 Field Surveys I II, Section I, supra note 32, at 87 
(the designation "personal searches" at page 87 is deemed to be 
the equivalent of a protective patdown). : 
6"The amount of non-dangerous weapons discovered in a search 
is insignificant. Ibid. This would seem to indicate that this pro-
cedure is not a very fruitful subterfuge if one assumes it is 
being used as a subterfuge. 
SiSee S.l, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), presently before 
Congress (the so-called "Dodd Firearms Bill") ; See also Tm~ 
CHALLEKGE OF CRH.IE IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 31, Chap-
ter 10 : Control of Firearms. 
683 
684 
-32-
tional judgment. Similarly, we contend that constitu-
tional standards for temporary field detention and pro-
tective patdown can be established which would produce 
distinctions of constitutional magnitude and which need 
not be cloaks ·covering conduct violative of human dig-
nity. 
The use of a constitutional standard less than prob-
able cause to arrest does not require that temporary 
field detentions and protective patdowns be conducted 
on police hunches, uncontrollable by judicial scrutiny. 
Just as the courts are able to distinguish those facts 
which constitute probable cause for an arrest from 
those which do not constitute such probable cause, so 
we are confident they can distinguish those facts which 
meet a constitutional standard for temporary field de-
tention and protective patdown from those which do 
not. In this regard there may be cases in which the 
courts have erred in applying this distinction, as well 
as some jurisdictions ~here the courts may have com-
pletely failed to draw such distinctions. Such judicial 
error should not be reason for complete abnegation 
of judicial power with respect to this important issue. 
Of all the jurisdictions which have upheld temporary 
field detention and protective patdown on a standard 
less than probable cause to arrest, the appellate courts 
of the State of California have undoubtedly had the 
most opportunity to develop and apply constitutional 
standards capable of distinguishing proper and im-
proper police practices in this area. This is true in part 
because of the judicial recognition of this conduct for a 
number of years, as well as the large number of de-
cisions which have arisen litigating the concepts· under-
-33-
lying the system. Thus we have chosen California as 
a model jurisdiction68 for the purpose of convincing 
this Court that the judiciary are capable of applying 
constitutional standards less than probable cause to 
arrest which can distinguish those practices which are 
proper and those which are improper.69 We thus 
propose to undertake the task requested by a recent 
commentator: 
"If probable cause is no longer to be the test, 
at least at the initial point of arrest, where is the 
line to be drawn short of indiscriminate police de-
tentions on hunch? No greater service could be 
rendered to advocates oi change in the law than 
the formulation of speciiic standards illuminat-
ing the limits of the proposed buff er zone which 
would lie between arrest on probable cause and 
the protection of the individual from intrusion 
based on nothing more substantial than a police-
man's hunch.1110 
68 As in other states, there may be decisions in California 
which have been erroneously decided on their facts or which fail 
to draw necessary constitutional distinctions with respect to tem-
porary field detention and protective patdown. This does not 
mean, however, that the California courts do not have the nec-
ess:iry tools to apply this system properly or that on other oc-
casions it has not been applied properly by the California courts. 
Similar mistakes by California with respect to search and seizure 
in other areas (see. e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 
( 1964), and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 ( 1967)) have not 
tarnished the renowned reputation and standing of the California 
courts, especially the California Supreme Court. 
69Similar consideration of California occurred in McCray v. 
Illinois. 386 U.S. 300 (1967), in which an amicus curiae brief, 
deemed by this court to be "helpful," discussed the experience of 
California. 386 U.S. at 306, n.7. 
7°Foote, supra note 8, at 407. 
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A. When Can a California Citizen Be Subjected to 
a Temporary Field Detention? 
The test established by the California Supreme Court 
for temporary field detention is as follows: 
"It is well established that a police officer in 
the discharge of his duties may detain and ques-
tion a person when the circumstances are such that 
would indicate to a reasonable man in a like posi-
tion that such a course is necessary to proper dis-
charge. of those duties. "71 
Lest it be thought that such a test is so imprecise as 
to permit blanket authorization for police conduct based 
on "hunches," one need only consider the facts and 
holding of the case in which this rule was announced. 
In People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe12 a private 
citizen found in a public place a kit containing apparatus 
used in administering narcotics and reported this to 
the police. During an i_nvestigation of this discovery, 
a police officer saw defendant drive through an ad-
jacent area in a 1960 Cadillac. The officer felt de-
fendant was out of place in the Cadillac and thus 
watched him closely. Defendant acted nervous and 
watched the officer in the rear view mirror. He drove 
out of the alley and parked immediately across the side-
walk from where the kit had been found. He left the 
car and walked over to a barber shop, stopping to 
look in the window. He then returned in the direction 
oi his car. At this point he was stopped by the officer 
and was nervous and evasive in answering questions. 
The defendant lied about a prior arrest and denied 
11People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 95-96, 
396 P. 2d i06, 708 (1964). 
12/bid. 
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knowledge of the kit. Thereafter, through a set of cir-
cumstances irrelevant to this brief, narcotics were found 
on his person. 
The California Supreme Court held the initial stop-
ping unlawful for the following reasons: 
"In the instant case the officers observed only 
that defendant was nervous, appeared to be wary 
of them, and that he parked his car adjacent to the 
point where the kit was found and thereafter took 
a rather aimless walk in the near vicinity. Further 
observations by the arresting officer to the effect 
that Reulman looked like an untruthful person and 
as though he did not belong in the Cadillac are 
not impressive and appear to add little to create 
any real suspicion, even when we consider that 
the officer was an experienced narcotics investiga-
tor, familiar with the conduct of suspects in like 
circumstances. (See People v. Cowman, 229 Cal. 
App.2d 109 [35 Cal.Rptr. 528].) We find little, 
if anything, to distinguish Reulman from any other 
harried citizen who may have innocently parked 
his automobile in the same spot as did Reulman. 
The trial judge's finding that reasonable cause for 
detention and questioning is lacking is thus sub-
stantially supported by the record.78 
•afd. at 96; 396 P. 2d at 709. See also People v. Henze, 
253 A.C.A. 1083, .... Cal. Rptr ..... (1967) and People v. Hitnt, 
250 A.C.A. 377, 58 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1967). in each of which the 
Court held the officer did not have sufficient cause to engage 
in a temporary field detention. It should be noted that in addi-
tion to these reported cases in which the temporary field deten-
tion was declared unlawful, there are additional appellate cases 
in California so holding which are not reported in an official re-
porter because of the rule in California that not all decisions need 
(This footnote is continued on the next page) 
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B. When Can a California Citizen Be Subjected 
to a Protective Patdown? 
The test established by the California Supreme Court 
for a protective patdown is as follows: 
"If the circumstances warrant it [a police of-
ficer] may in self-protection request a suspect to 
alight from an automobile or to submit to a su-
perficial search for concealed weapons.111• 
Here again, lest it be thought that such a test is 
so imprecise as to fail to permit distinctions of con-
stitutional magnitude, one need only consider the facts 
and holding of the case in which this rule was an-
nounced. In People v. Mickelson76 an officer had gone 
to a market where a robbery had just been reported. 
The robber was described as a fairly tall white man of 
large build with dark hair wearing a red sweater and 
armed with a .45 automatic. While driving away from 
the market 20 minutes later the officer saw a station 
wagon coming toward him with two persons in it. This 
was about six blocks from the market. The driver 
matched the description of the robber. The station 
wagon proceeded to drive around the area making nu-
merous turns.· The officer overtook the station wagon 
and observed the -passenger, the defendant in this case, 
bend forward in the seat, forward and down and raise 
be published. (See, for an example of such an unreported ruling 
striking down a temporary field detention, People v. Dresslar, 
Crim. No. 12.345 ( 1966), decided by the Coi;rt of Appeal, Sec-
ond Appellate District, Division 4.) Additionally, trial courts in 
California are not required to render any written opinion in cases 
where, because of an unlawful temporary field detention or pro-
tective patdown, they refuse the admissibility of evidence, result-
ing in the acquittal of the defendant. 
14People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 380 P. Zd 658, 
660 (1960). 
16lbid. 
• 
• 
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back up. The officer stopped the station wagon. While 
the officer was radioing for assistance, the driver 
walked back to talk to him. The driver stated that he 
was trying to get home, was lost and was looking for a 
freeway. The assisting officers arrived. Defendant, a 
passenger in the car, got out of the car on the request 
of the police. The police then looked in the car and an 
overnight bag was found stufied under the right front 
seat. The bag was opened and found to contain four 
screwdrivers, a flashlight, a pair of gloves, and two 
socks, one of which was full of nickels, dimes and quar-
ters later determined to have been burglarized from 
telephone booths. Defendant and the driver were ar-
rested on suspicion of burglary. The officer stated that 
his purpose in examining the bag was the possibility 
of a gun being there. 
The California Supreme Court held as follows: 
"Both occupants were out of the car away from 
any weapons that might have been concealed there-
in. Instead of interrogating Zauzig [the driver] 
and defendant with respect to the robbery or re-
questing them to accompany the officers the few 
blocks to the market for possible identification, the 
officer elected to rummage through closed bag-
gage found in the car in the hope of turning up 
evidence that might connect Zauzig with the rob-
bery. That search exceeded the bounds of reason-
able investigation.1176 
i6Jd. at 454; 380 P. 2d at 662. 
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C. In Those Situations Where a Protective Pat-
down Is Permissibie, to What Degree of Prob-
ing Must a California Citizen Be Subjected as 
Part of the Protective Patdown? 
The California Supreme Court has1 so far, not had 
occasion to verbalize a test for the degree of probing 
permissible as an incident of a protective patdown. 
However, at least one court of appeal has discussed this 
problem and has made a significant constitutional dis-
tinction between proper and improper practices. 
In People v. Martines71 two officers noticed de-
fendant and two companions at 1 :15 a.m. walking 
through an unlighted alley at the rear of a closed busi-
ness area. The officers stopped defendant and asked 
him for identification. Defendant stated that he had 
none. One officer made a cursory search of defendant 
due to the darkness in the alley and for his own safety. 
The search was only oi the outside of defendant's cloth-
ing. The officer felt a_n object that appeared to be a 
knife in defendanfs pocket. In attempting to remove 
the knife he removed a paper wad which was found to 
contain 9 marijuana cigarettes. Defendant made no 
threatening moves or offensive or aggressive state-
ments. The object thought possibly to be a knife was a 
combination metal nail file-bottle opener. When closed 
it was 0 inch wide1 0 inch thick and 2>:4 inches 
long. When opened it contained a small blade, a nail 
file and a bottle opener. 
The Court of Appeal stated as follows: 
"In the circumstances a cursory search was 
warranted. Nothing was revealed by the cursory 
11228 Cal. App. 2d 245, 39 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1964). 
• 
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search which warranted the officer in emptying 
appellant's pocket as he did .... 
"In the case at bar it seems that the cursory 
search made should have reassured the officer rath-
er than have alarmed him. ms 
From the above study of California cases it is ap-
parent that those who would detract from the feasibil-
ity of establishing a constitutionai standard for tem-
porary field detention and protective patdown on the 
ground that it is impossible to establish a standard 
which will be capable of distinguishing proper from im-
proper police conduct simply do not give the judiciary 
due credit for their abilities. 
CONCLUSION. 
It would be naive to state that members of minority 
groups are never harassed by the practice of temporary 
field detention and protective patdowns. It is just as 
naive to tell policemen that . they do not need to use 
either of these practices in their work. Irrespective of 
the degree of truth in either of these statements, un-
doubtedly each of these opinions is the prevailing view 
18[ d. at 248; 39 Cal. Rptr. at 528. Accord, People v. Simon, 
45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P. 2d 531 (1955), wherein the California 
Supreme Court, although not stating any general rule relating to 
the intensity with which a protective patdown could be conducted, 
applied its conception of such intensity in the following language; 
"Even if it were conceded that in some circumstances an 
officer making such an inquiry might be justified in running 
his hands over a person's clothing to protect himself from 
an ·attack with a hidden weapon, certainly a search so inten-
sive as that made here could not be so justified .... In the 
present case the officer searched first and asked questions 
only after his search uncovered the incriminating cigarette, 
and there is nothing to indicate that had he confined himself 
to a reasonable inquiry, he would have discovered anything 
to confirm his suspicion that defendant had no lawful right 
to be where he was." 45 Cal. 2d at 650, 290 P. 2d at 534. 
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within the particular group under consideration, i.e., 
the minority groups and the policemen. It would cer-
tainly be worthy of the dignity of the law if it could 
give recognition to both these views in such a way as 
to accommodate both. This would truly benefit mi-
nority groups as well as policemen in their respect both 
for each other and for the law. Thus there would be 
"no war between the Constitution and common 
sense."79 
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